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BOOK REVIEWS
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT. By Grant Gilmore.' Columbus, Ohio;
Ohio State University Press, 1974. Pp. x, 151. $8.00.
Professor Gilmore states: "We are told that Contract, like God, is
dead. And so it is. Indeed the point is hardly worth arguing any-
more. ' 2 But he then warns that
the most lovingly detailed knowledge of the present state of things-
the most up-to-the-minute list-begins to be useful to us only when we
are in a position to compare it with what we know about what was going
on last year and the year before that and so on back through the float-
ing mists of time.3
This entertaining and thought provoking series of lectures4 suggests an
historical point of comparison, "the general theory of contract." Ac-
cording to Professor Gilmore, the "theory" was a curious and ingenious
machine painstakingly assembled from the spare parts of English and
American case law. It was invented by Langdell,0 developed by
Holmes," and perfected by Williston 7 at the Harvard Law School in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." At the center of the
machine was the great balance wheel, "consideration."
Professor Gilmore rightly says, "[tihere are few things more fascinat-
ing in our jurisprudence than the organization of what comes, almost
immediately, to be perceived as a new field of law,"0 and observes that
"the common law had done very nicely for several centuries without
anyone realizing that there was such a thing as the law of contracts."10
1. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
2. G. GiLMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNRAcT 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as GLMORE].
3. Id. at 4.
4. Delivered at the Ohio State University School of Law, id. at ix.
5. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of the Harvard Law School, 1870-1895.
6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. His Lowell lectures, The Common Law, were pub-
lished by Little, Brown in 1881. Holmes was a lecturer at Harvard in 1871-1872, and
a professor in 1882. After service on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he
was appointed to the United States Supreme Court where he sat from 1902 to 1932.
7. Samuel Williston, Professor of Law at Harvard University, 1890-1930.
8. GmMORE 5-31.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 5.
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He suggests that "the idea that there was such a thing as a general law-
or theory-of contract seems never to have occurred to the legal
mind," until Christopher Columbus Langdell "somehow stumbled across
it."' I As used by Professor Gilmore, the meaning of a "general law-
or theory--of contract" is, however, unclear. A "general theory" is
clearly different from a "general law;" and the suggestion that there was
at some time a "general law" reflecting the "general theory" is contra-
dicted by Professor Gilmore's assertion that unity of doctrine was only
achieved by an extremely selective handling of case material-ignoring
those cases at variance with the theory.
In fact, the book is largely concerned with the rise and fall of a
"general theory" of contract. We are given an account of a develop-
ment: discovery of "contract" by Langdell; exposition of a "bargain
theory" of consideration by Holmes; working out of the implications by
Williston. 2 Still, Professor Gilmore's definition of the "theory" re-
mains unclear. As a legal historian he must be aware that there were
"general theories" of contract long before the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, for example, the work of the medieval canonists. More-
over, Langdell did not write the first book on common law contracts;
that distinction belongs to John Joseph Powell,13 who, inspired by
Pothier's achievements in producing order from the disorder of the civil
law, 1 4 attempted to do likewise for the common law.
Powell's choice of subject matter is of great significance (and here we
echo Professor Gilmore's comments on Langdell). Contract law, at the
end of the eighteenth century, was just beginning to emerge and expand
its sphere. This development was due to many factors, but the theoreti-
cal justification was provided by continental writers.' 5 By the time
Christopher Columbus Langdell set out on his voyage, the dead hand of
11. Id. at 6.
12. See id. at 5-53.
13. J. POWELL, ESSAY ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs AND AGREEMENTS (1790). A
more jurisprudential treatment may be found in H. COLEBROOK, OBLIGATIONS AND CON-
TRACTS (1818). For an interesting account of the transition that was occurring at that
time, see Horwitz, Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HAnv. L. REV.
917 (1974).
14. R. POTHER, TRArrE DES OBLIGATIONS (1761). Incidentally, Pothier anticipated
Langdell in using the Socratic method for teaching law. See G. LE TROSNE, ELOGE
HISTORIQUE DE PoTmEm. The case method was developed for teaching ethics in the early
seventeenth century.




860 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:858
continental theory was lying heavily upon the common law (something
it is important to remember in considering Professor Gilmore's account
of Holmes' influence), and Langdell's writings exhibit that influence.' 0
Holmes' writings were an important part of the reaction to the conti-
nental influence,17 and the reader who remembers him for his dictum
"[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,""' will
be surprised to learn of his role in the "general theory" affair. His great
series of lectures, The Common Law, was intended to remove the
varnish of abstract theory that the law had acquired.' 9 No one familiar
with the development of the law of contract in the nineteenth century,
which as Professor A.W.B. Simpson has said, shows the results of too
many theories chasing too few facts, 0 could deny that Holmes' objective
was worthwhile.2 ' His analysis of contractual obligation, the "risk
theory," derived from his rejection of the "will theory" of contracts, and
from the Austinian concept of legal duty.22
In this context, Professor Gilmore's citation of Holmes' statement that
"[t]he only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that
the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not
come to pass,"28 in support of the assertion that the "general theory"
was "dedicated to the proposition that ideally no one should be liable to
anyone for anything," 24 seems inapposite. Holmes' assertion, properly
16. See, e.g., C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF TnE LAw OF CoNTRAcrs 16, 23 (1880)
(postal acceptance rule).
17. See generally M. HowE, Jusncn OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THn PRovINo
YEARS (1963) [hereinafter cited as HowE].
18. 0. HOLmES, Tan COMMON LAW 1 (1881) [hereinafter cited as HoLMEs].
19. See generally HowE.
20. Lecture by Professor Simpson to the Selden Society, July 3, 1974.
21. The development of the doctrine of mistake is a good example of the kind of
confusion to which an excess of doctrine led. Professor Gilmore, incidentally says of
Holmes' explanation of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864) (contract void
because parties said different things, not because they meant different things): "The
magician who could 'objectify' Raffles v. Wichelhaus ... could. . . objectify anything."
GILMORE 41. But that method is precisely how most modem courts would approach
the matter. Whether the parties' saying different things (the effect of the plaintiffs de-
murrer was to admit this) was important is another matter. See, e.g., UNIFORM COM-
MECrAL CODE § 2-322(3) (1972).
22. HOWE 77.
23. HOLMEs 301.
24. GILMORE 14. Holmes apparently did not mean that there is an "election" to
perform or to apply damages, the common understanding of the passage. See Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock, Dec. 11, 1928, in 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK L~rrERs 233-34 (M. Howe ed. 1941). It may be, however, that the view ex-
pressed in this letter represents belated second thoughts.
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:858]
understood, means that if a person undertakes the risk of something
coming to pass, he is liable to pay damages whether or not performance
is within his power. Given Holmes' narrow concept of a legal duty, this
view is difficult to refute.25
According to Professor Gilmore's exposition, a person incurs liability
under the "general theory" because the law finds "consideration." Noth-
ing is consideration unless there is "the relation of reciprocal conven-
tional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and prom-
ise. '- This certainly is, as Professor Gilmore says, a "mysterious
phrase." 27  It is found, in a passage in which Holmes is trying to
distinguish a condition from consideration. A truckman's statement
that he will take a cask of brandy from Boston to Cambridge, can either
be a gratuitous promise subject to a condition that if it is delivered to
him, he will deliver it, or a contract, the consideration for which is the
delivery to him. Holmes believed that we can only tell which it is by the
way the parties have dealt with it.28 Professor Gilmore, however, cites
only part of the relevant passage and makes much play of it: "Now the
vulgar error . . . has been exploded. . . . No matter how much
detriment a promisee may have suffered, he has not thereby, necessarily
furnished any consideration. Nor does he have, so far as Holmes takes
us, any right to redress ... ."29 But Holmes took us only that far
because in the context of that part of The Common Law, there was no
point in proceeding further. He did not say there is no liability however
much detriment a promisee may have suffered. 0
It is difficult to see The Common Law as a link between Langdell on
the one hand and Williston and the First Restatements" on the other.
Holmes referred to Langdell as representing the "powers of darkness; he
is all for logic and hates any reference to anything outside of it."3 2
25. HOWE 236.




30. See GILMORE 35.
31. Holmes was skeptical of the Restatement project. See Letters from Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock, Feb. 24, 1923 & Dec. 11, 1928, in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 114, 234 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
32. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock, April 10, 1881,
in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 17 (M. Howe ed. 1941). In the same letter, Holmes
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Professor Gilmore's account of Holmes' influence on Williston may well
be correct, but he presents very little evidence to support it, although
this deficiency may to some extent be due to the, problems of turning
lectures into a book.
Perhaps Holmes was misread by his contemporaries, but Professor
Gilmore does not discuss this. His only such reference 8 is concerned
with Holmes' influence on the rejection of the "will" theory of contracts.
Gilmore says that Holmes and his successors substituted an "objectivist"
approach for the "subjectivist' approach the courts had been following
"almost instinctively." 34  If so, then Holmes achieved his aim. This
conclusion depends, however, on what we mean by "objectivist" and
"subjectivist." In The Common Law, Holmes was engaged in a philo-
sophical debate, in which he was propounding "objectivism" against the
"subjectivism" of Kant and Hegel.3" No doubt his judicial decisions
tended to reflect the "period style," but his philosophy was fundamental-
ly opposed to Langdell's formalism. It is no great surprise to find him
prepared to recognize reliance theory for the enforcement of a prom-
ise.36 Perhaps a better description of contract theory in the "formal
period" is "nonparticularist," rather than "objectivist." That is, rules of
law were taken at a high level of abstraction and given a general
application (which is not to say that the rules were simplified; on the
contrary, they tended to proliferate). 37
If Holmes' "bargain theory" was of central importance, it is interest-
ing to speculate why this occurred. The suggestion of a connection with
laissez-faire economic theory, although clearly correct,3 8 does not ex-
plain the observation that the contract law in the "formal period" was
often uncommercial. A good illustration is the difficulty experienced
by the American courts in coming to terms with requirements contracts.
Professor Gilmore suggests that the doctrine of mutuality of obligation,
from which these difficulties arose, was a reflection of the reformulation
of the doctrine of consideration in terms of "reciprocal conventional
33. HOWE 246.
34. GiLMORE 35.
35. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw xv-xvi, xx-xxi (Little, Brown ed. 1963)
(M. Howe introduction).
36. Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N.E. 397 (1901). See also K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADMON 187-88 (1960).
37. See GiLMoRE 48, 99 (tendency to view questions of fact as questions of law).
38. See L. FRmDMAN, CoNTRAcr LAW IN AMERICA 20-21 (1956).
[Vol. 1975:858
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inducement.."39  That doctrine appeared, however, some years before
The Common Law in the case of Bailey v. Austrian.40 In that case,
Justice Berry arrived at the conclusion that requirements contracts
lacked consideration because there was no mutuality of obligation. He
reached this conclusion after an apparent misreading of a passage in
Parsons on Contracts dealing with "mutuality of engagement. '41  This
misreading may have been due to some "felt-necessity" about the char-
acter of bargains the law ought to enforce.42 The English courts did
not have the same difficulty. 43
The doctrine of Bailey v. Austrian is an illustration of the aberrations
of judicial reasoning that characterized the "formal period" of United
States legal history,4 4 the development of which is, for the writer, more
interesting than an account of possible links between Langdell, Holmes,
Williston and particular doctrines. Even Williston's exposition may
have been more faithful to the spirit of his time than to "the spirit of his
master's thought."" What were the causes of this formalist phase?
Professor Gilmore suggests that the state-by-state fragmentation of the
law, which began quite early in the century, was a factor. He writes
39. GILMoRE 33-34.
40. 19 Minn. 535 (1873). The writer does not know whether this was the first case
espousing the doctrine.
41. T. PARSONS, 1 THE LAW OF CoNm'rS 470-71 (6th ed. 1873). The cases cited
by Parsons include Dorsey v. Rockwood, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 126 (1852); McKinley v.
Watkins, 13 Ill. 140 (1851); Lester v. Jewett, 12 Barb. 502 (Sup. Ct. 1849); Burton
v. Great N. Ry., 156 Eng. Rep. 216 (Ex. 1854); Hopkins v. Logan, 151 Eng. Rep.
103 (Ex. 1839); Biddle v. Dowse, 108 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1827); Kingston v. Phelps,
170 Eng. Rep. 163 (N.P. 1794); Nichols v. Raynbred, 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (C.P. -). In
Burton, Parke, B., gave an example, which, while supporting the judgment, was clearly
based on the supposition that a contract existed.-
42. Some courts seem to have had the notion that there needed to be a measure of
equivalency in the respondents' undertakings. See Havinghurst & Berman, Requirement
and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1932). See also T.W. Jenkins & Co. v. Ana-
heim Sugar Co., 247 F. 958 (9th Cir. 1918); Crane v. Crane & Co., 105 F. 869 (7th
Cir. 1901).
43. See, e.g., Percival, Ltd. v. London County Council, 87 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 677
(1918); In re Gloucester Election Petition, [1901] K.B. 683; Foxwood v. Rhodes, 33
LT.R. (n.s.) 314 (Ex. 1875); Great N. Ry. v. Whitham, L.R. 9 C.P. 16 (1873);
Bealey v. Stuart, 158 Eng. Rep. 672 (Ex. 1862); Wood v. Governor & Co. of Copper
Miners in England Co., 137 Eng. Rep. 358 (C.P. 1849).
44. See generally K. LLEWELLYN, Trm COMMON LAW TRADrITON (1960); Llewellyn,
On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law, 9 U. Cm. L. Ruv. 224 (1942); Pound,
The Causes of Popular Disaffection with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REv.
729 (1906).
45. GILMORE 114 n.43.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/12
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that "[nIational unity on a case level . . . required what we might call
an intensive purification of doctrine."46 This might explain the absence
of the extreme of formalism in England. Gilmore suggests that distrust
of the civil jury was another factor, and another possible reason for the
contrasting English experience. The decline of the English civil jury
had already set in at the time the United States was undergoing its
greatest excess of formalism. Certainly some formalism existed in
England before the decline set in, particularly during the middle years of
the century.47 In other words, formalism predates the "general theory"
by some years. Moreover, the "consideration episode," which Gilmore
describes as an "Anglo-American exclusive," insofar as it occurred in
England, goes back at least as far as Eastwood v. Kenyon.48
Professor Gilmore's "general theory," does not seem to amount to
anything more than that bundle of doctrines, delimiting and relating to
the area usually called "contract law," which reflects the extreme for-
malism of the United States legal system in the closing years of the
nineteenth century. The bundle of doctrines seems to lack sufficient
cohesion to be called a "general theory," at least on the evidence pre-
sented by Professor Gilmore.
The decline of what Professor Gilmore calls the "general theory,"
coincided, of course, with the decline of formalism.49 He suggests that
"contract" is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of "tort." A
central part of his thesis lies in his observations about sections 75 and 90
of the First Restatement."0 Section 7551 represented in substance Wil-
liston's proposal, and is, as Professor Gilmore points out, pure Holmes.5 2
Section 9053 was the work of Corbin. Professor Gilmore suggests that
46. Id. at 97.
47. Some of the early "railway ticket" cases illustrate English formalism. See, e.g.,
Walker v. York & N. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 948 (Q.B. 1853).
48. 113 Eng. Rep. 482 (Q.B. 1840).
49. See generally K. LLEWILYN, Tn COMMON LAW TRADTON (1960).
50. GILMORJ 60-61.
51. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932):
(1) Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or
(d) a return promise
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
52. GILMoRE 61.
53. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRAcTS § 90 (1932):
[Vol. 1975:858
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these two sections indicate the Restatement's schizophrenia, 54 since they
stand for the old order and the new, and the one must swallow up the
other.55 On the contrary, even if we agree with Corbin56 (as the writer
does) that consideration is not one doctrine but many, section 75 is a
reasonable definition of the area in which the expectation interest will
usually be protected. This is not to say that there may not be other
grounds for enforcing promises, for example, past consideration in some
circumstances. Section 75 is objectionable only in terms of the former
tendency to confine liability within its four corners. When we come to
section 90, however, we are given the somewhat uncertain decree that
"a promise is . . . binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise." The section should not be limited to promises;
statements less than promises can reasonably be expected to induce
detrimental reliance in some circumstances. 57 Thus, arguably, the sec-
tion does belong to the law of torts. The debate at this point, however,
has perhaps become little more than terminological quibbling. It does
not really matter whether we choose to call "consideration" only those
elements falling within section 75 and to define "contract" in those
terms. The important thing is that in the process we do not confine the
reach of liability.
The writer, who yields to no one in his admiration of most of
Professor Gilmore's writings, must express disappointment about this
book, entertaining as it is. Apart from the account of Holmes' influ-
ence, which on the evidence the writer found not entirely convincing,
The Death of Contract seems to add little to what has already been
written on the subject.5 s
JOHN ADAMS*
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
54. GILMORE 60.
55. Id.
56. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON COT-.ACTS § 109, at 161-63 (one vol. ed. 1952).
57. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
58. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38; K. LLEWBLLYN, supra note 44.
* Professor of Law, Sheffield University.
BOOK REVIEWS
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/12
